WHAT ARE THE BASIC RULES ON AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION?

Question: Distinguish substantial from formal amendment.

Answer: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.

The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. (LEVISTE vs. ALMEDA, G.R. No. 182677, August3, 2010)

Question: What is the test whether the amendment is substantial or merely formal?

Answer: The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.(Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.160451, February 9, 2007)

Question: What kind of amendment of the complaint/information can be made before arraignment?

Answer: As a rule, both formal and substantial amendments are allowed before arraignment even without leave of court. By way of exception, an amendment before plea which downgrades the nature of the offense charged or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. (Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure)

Question: Before arraignment, can amendment of the complaint/information be allowed to cure any and all defects thereof?

Answer: No. It must be clarified that not all defects in the information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible. (LEVISTE vs. ALMEDA, G.R.No. 182677, August 3, 2010)

Question:  After the accused entered his plea, may the Information for homicide be still amended to charge the more serious offense of murder?

Answer: No, because such amendment upgrading the charge from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment. The amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one of substance with very serious consequences. In keeping with Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, only formal amendment can be allowed after arraignment but it is always upon leave of court and provided no prejudice can be made on the rights of the accused. After the accused is arraigned, substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. (Fronda-Baggaov. People, G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007)

Question: The original Information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, "using superior strength, inflicting . . . mortal wounds which were . . . the direct . . . cause of his death" In filing this information, the prosecutor expressly designated it as one for homicide.

 After arraignment, the prosecution moves to amend the original Information by changing the express designation of the crime charged from homicide to murder. Can this be allowed?

Answer: Yes. Notice that the original information already contains the allegation that the killing was done with the “use of superior strength”. This allegation already qualified the killing as murder regardless of how such killing is technically designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor.

When the appellation of the crime charged as determined by the public prosecutor, does not exactly correspond to the actual crime constituted by the criminal acts described in the information to have been committed by the accused, what controls is the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the public prosecutor. In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information.

Under these circumstances, the amendment of the Information by merely changing its express designation from homicide to murder is only a formal amendment and no prejudice can be made against the rights of the accused. (DANILO BUHAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996)

WHEN ARE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS ALLOWED?

Question: Can amendments to pleadings be made even the cause of action or defense may be altered? 

Answer: Yes. However, it is always upon leave of Court. To be allowed, the substantial amendment must not be intended to delay the proceedings but will rather serve the higher interest of justice as when it is meant to present the full and actual merits of the case.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SECTION 3.  Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

Take note that Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court applies to pleadings in general, whether it be initiatory like a complaint or a responsive one like an answer. 

In Valenzuela v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 131175, August28, 2001, it was emphasized as follows:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”

            This instructive pronouncement of the High Court was again revisited in the case of Tiu vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009, wherein it was held that “even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.” In the same case, it was further emphasized that amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense.  

7 LOVE QUOTES FROM THE COURT

The Supreme Court, once in a while, steps out from the chamber of pure legal tones, and vividly paints its picture of love and relationship. Below are only a few of the High Court’s distinctive love quotes.

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. (Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70890, 18 September 1992)

If the two (persons) eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.” (Chua-Qua vs. Clave, G.R. No. L-49549, 30 August 1990)

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason. (Patricia Figueroa vs. Simeon Barranco, Jr., GR No. 97369, 31 July 1997)

The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial promise of love for better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part,’ are sometimes easier said than done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of matrimonial shoals. (People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Takbobo, GR No. 102984, 30 June 1993)

Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao- Tsoi, GR No. 119190, 16 January 1997)

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected. (Dr. Tayag as quoted in Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738)

In rape, the ‘sweetheart’ defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust. (People vs. Olesco, G.R. No. 174861, April 11, 2011)

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A DOSE OF LEGAL QUOTES

CAN YOU FORCE YOUR SPOUSE TO LIVE WITH YOU?

Question: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?

Answer: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

The obligation of spouses to live together under one roof is a highly personal obligation on their respective part, and this should spontaneously flow from mutual love and affection. This cannot be enforced by law or by the Courts.

In Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio and Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000 and G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000, respectively, it was pertinently held that:

With his [husband] full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.m

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means and process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

Needless to say, this ruling equally applies for a wife who voluntarily decides not live with her husband for purely personal reasons. 

BOARD EXAM; CRIMINOLOGIST LICENSURE EXAM RESULTS (Released on November 16, 2012)

Results of October 2012 Criminologist Licensure Examination

The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) announces that 7,171 out of 22,289 passed the Criminologist Licensure Examination given by the Board of Criminology in the cities of  Manila, Baguio, Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Legazpi, Lucena,  Pagadian, Tacloban, Tuguegarao  and Zamboanga  last  October 2012.  

The result of examination with respect to one (1) examinee was withheld pending final determination of his liabilities under the rules and regulations governing licensure examination.

The members of the Board of Criminology who gave the licensure examination are Hon. Lourdes W. Aniceto, Chairman;  Hon. Carolina J. Esguerra  and  Hon. Ernesto V. Cabrera, Members. 

The results were released in twelve (12) working days from the last day of examination. Registration for the issuance of Professional Identification Card (ID) and Certificate of Registration will start on November 26, 2012 but not later than November 29, 2012. Those who will register are required to bring the following: duly accomplished Oath Form or Panunumpa ng Propesyonal, current Community Tax Certificate (cedula), 2 pieces passport size picture (colored with white background and complete nametag), 1 piece 1” x 1” picture (colored with white background and complete nametag), 2 sets of metered documentary stamps and 1 short brown envelope with name and profession and to pay the Initial Registration Fee of P600 and Annual Registration Fee of P450 for 2012-2015.  Successful examinees should personally register and sign in the Roster of Registered Professionals.

The date and venue for the oathtaking ceremony of the new successful examinees in the said examination WILL BE ANNOUNCED LATER.

The successful examinees who garnered the ten (10) highest places in the October

2012 Criminologist Licensure Examination are the following:

   

1 MARLO PALMERO  (DAJAO STO. NIÑO COLLEGE OF ORMOC)-91.30

2 MARK ALLEN MENDOZA (PULIDO CENTRAL LUZON COLLEGE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGYOLONGAPO )-90.60

3 ERIC SAWATI  CATTE (UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS-(for.BAGUIO C.F.) -90.50

4 MARA MYRTHEL (MAGALING  LEGASPI UNIVERSIDAD DE MANILA (CITY COLL. OF MANILA) -90.10

5 ALLAN CABALLERO  ABAQUITA (UNIVERSITY OF LA SALETTESANTIAGO)-90.05

6 VINCENT DARWIN RODRIGUEZ  (SULTAN UNIVERSITY OF ILOILO)- 89.95

7 JOUIE LITAWEN  DONATO (UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO)- 89.65

8 PERLA VITO CRUZ  ARROYO (PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MUNTINLUPA (MPC) -89.55

9 MERIAM ASAN  DERO (WESTERN PHILIPPINES UNIV).(for.PALAWAN N.A.C)-

ABORLAN -89.05

ROFEL BAYAGA  KIAMCO (UNIVERSITY OF CEBU)- 89.05

10 ARMANDO COTILLON  MARIANO  JR (UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS (for.BAGUIO C.F.) -89.00

 REYMERT LIBUNA  PECSON (NOTRE DAME OF SALAMAN COLLEGE)-89.00

Roll of Successful Examinees in theCRIMINOLOGIST LICENSURE EXAMINATION 

Held on OCTOBER 27, 2012 & FF. DAYS                

 CONGRATS!!!

source-PRC

DO NOT PHOTOSHOP YOUR EX-GIRLFRIEND'S PICTURE!

Facts: A woman received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender is her former boyfriend. After she got the obscene picture, she got other text messages from the former boyfriend. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

Question: Is the former boyfriend liable for the crime of violence against women?

Answer: Yes. Violence against women include any form of harassment or violence that causes or will likely to cause substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman with whom the accused has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child.

      Thus, Republic Act. 9262 provides that:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

x x x x

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

x x x x

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

            The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Question: For purposes of prosecuting the crime of violence against women, is it necessary that the woman must have engaged on some sexual act/s with the accused?

Answer: No. It is enough that the accused and the complaining woman had a dating relationship. "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. "Romantically involved" does not imply sexual relation. The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. (RUSTAN ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.No. 182835, April 20, 2010)

Question: May the crime of violence against women be committed by a lesbian?

Answer: Apparently, yes. The law says that violence against women and their children" is committed by ANY person against a woman with whom the offender had sexual or dating relationship. Undeniably, a lesbian can possibly have a sexual or dating relationship with another woman. 

CAN A MARRIED WOMAN USE HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT?

Question: May a woman, who have been using her husband’s surname, choose to revert to the use of her maiden name despite the subsistence of her marriage?

Answer: Yes. Article 370 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

 (1)       HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR

(2)       HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR

(3)   HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS “MRS.”

The use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of  Yasin v.Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court. A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage.  She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status.  Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.

Question: For purposes of renewal of passport, can a married woman discontinue using her husband’s surname as indicated in her existing passport and now use her maiden name despite the subsistence of her marriage?

Answer: Generally, no. Such discontinuance in the renewal passport can only be allowed in three instances, namely: (1) when she has been divorced and the divorce decree is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; (2) or widowed; (3) or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void.   This is consistent with Section 5(d) of Republic Act 8239 which is the law governing passport issuance. Outside of these three instances, a married woman can not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.

Question: But can such married woman discontinue using her maiden name and now use her husband’s surname in her replacement passport?

Answer: Yes. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name.  If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so.  The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. (Ma. Virginia V. Remo vs. Secretary of ForeignAffairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON ACADEMIC STANDING

Question: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?

Answer: Yes. The basis for the damages would be the bad faith and breach by the school of its contractual obligation towards its students not only in providing them with quality education, but also in promptly informing them of their academic deficiencies. The negligent act of the professor in not timely submitting the grades can be legally attributed against the school being the employer.

Thus, in University of the East vs. Romeo A. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000, it was pertinently held as follows:

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school’s commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former’s agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other such information. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution’s way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter’s grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.

xxx Petitioner (the school), in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.xxx

xxx It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school’s rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students’ standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. xxx

xxx Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damage. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.xxx

xxx Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.xxx

EXPRESS RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP IS IMPORTANT!

Question: Are dual citizens qualified to run for elective positions in the Philippines?

Answer: No. Section 40 (d) of the Local Government expressly provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified.

Question: Under Republic Act No. 9225 or otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, upon taking his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, former natural-born Filipino citizens who subsequently become naturalized citizens of another country may reacquire their Filipino citizenship and retain their status as a natural-born.

After such taking of oath of allegiance, would one be now qualified to run for an elective position in the country?

Answer: No. The only effect of taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is that he reacquires his lost Filipino citizenship and retains his being a natural-born. It will not ipso jure result to his renouncing his foreign citizenship. Therefore, he would be considered as a dual citizen and as such still disqualified pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local Government.

In order to qualify for an elective post, one must, in addition to taking an oath of allegiance, also expressly make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship.  RA 9225 provides as follows:

Section 5.  Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities  under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: 

x x x x

 (2)  Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

The rulings Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship no longer apply. 

Thus, in the case of ROSELLER DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.180048, June 19, 2009, the Supreme Court en banc ruled that mere filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The renunciation of foreign citizenship does not necessarily come with the re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship as to qualify one to run for elective public position. 

In the case of TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, the Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate that failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

WHEN IS AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT A MATTER OF RIGHT?

Question: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?

Answer: Yes. This was the issue raised and resolved in the case of REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 133657, May 29,2002. It was held that:

Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing of an Answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10.  Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer.

Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.

The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.

Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.

Question: Is amendment of complaint still a matter of right when other defendants have already filed their Answers?

 Answer: Yes. As held in the same case of REMINGTON, “the fact that the other defendants below have filed their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.”